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FEDERAL "GOING PRIVATE" STANDARDS: A NEW
DIRECTION FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and its corollary, rule
10b-5, 2 which prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities, have become the basis of what has been termed a new federal
common law of corporations. 3 Under their authority, the process of "going
private'"--the procedure by which a public company eliminates its public
shareholders through, most commonly, corporate mergers, tender offers,
reverse stock splits or some combination thereof 4-recently has come under
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." It has been noted that the rule is broader
than the section 10(b) enabling language and has "modernized the 1934 Act to keep pace with the
development or discovery of securities practices which undermined the integrity of the market."
Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook. The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55
Va. L. Rev. 1103, 1118 (1969) [hereinafter cited as New Fraud].
3. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 834 (3d Cip.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 (1961). See generally Borden, Going
Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 987, 1037-39 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Borden]; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law- Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J.
663 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cary]; Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. Law. 593
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer].
4. For a general discussion of the means, methods and advantages of the "going private"
procedure see 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law, passim (1975) [hereinafter cited as l~rombergh F.
O'Neal & J. Derwin, Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates 3-139 (1961) (hereinafter
cited as O'Neal & Derwin]; Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28
Stan. L. Rev. 487, 491-96 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Greene]; Swanson, The Elimination of
Public Shareholders: Going Private, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 609 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Swanson);
Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 Fordham L Rev. 796,
796-800 (1976).
The return to private ownership has been spurred by the expense involved in complying with
rigid SEC registration and disclosure requirements; the collapse of investor interest following the
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federal scrutiny. Increasingly, these transactions have been attacked by
minority shareholders claiming such transactions violate the fraud provisions
of the section and the rule, despite the fact that, in most cases, the procedure
utilized is one expressly authorized by the law of the state of incorporation. 5
Though several circuits have indicated a willingness to entertain such claims, 6
until recently, the Second Circuit (in which most of the "going private" cases
arise) has fairly consistently held that full compliance with the disclosure
requirements of section 10(b) and rule lob-5, and with applicable state law,
bars a federal action for fraud, 7 notwithstanding the patent unfairness of the
transaction. 8 This attitude probably was based on two fundamental uncer-
tainties: first, whether section 10(b) was intended to encompass the questions
raised by the "going private" phenomenon; 9 second, whether scrutiny of such
transactions should be left to state courts, 10 which historically have had
"going public" rush of the 1960's; tax savings; disappointment with the public; the inappropriate-
ness of being public experienced by some companies; and the lure of greater freedom of action
and increased benefits to insiders following the return to private ownership. Swanson, supra at
613.
5. Many state laws permit the merger of two domestic corporations without shareholder
approval if one owns the requisite percentage of the outstanding stock of the other. See, e.g., Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1975) (90%); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975)
(95%). In a typical "going private" transaction, minority shareholders in X corporation will be
offered a fixed sum for their shares by Y corporation (which may itself be controlled by the same
group which controls X corporation). When enough shares are tendered, Y will announce its plan
to merge with X under the applicable state law, cancelling all X corporation shares not tendered
and giving the minority (public) shareholders cash for their holdings. Where shareholder approval
is not required, the merger is termed a short-form merger; where less than the required
percentage of the target company is acquired, shareholder approval is necessary and the merger is
called a long-form merger.
6. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974), aff'g 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1970); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d
262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
7. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764,
767-68 (2d Cir. 1964); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Dreier v. Music Makers Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 94,406, at 95,410 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
8. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972); Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp.
12, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Dreier v. Music Makers
Group, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 94,406, at 95,410 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
9. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1964); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (rule lob-5 does not
extend beyond simple disclosure requirements); see notes 22-26 infra and accompanying text.
10. Since "going private" transactions often implicate questions of corporate mismanagement
and fiduciary duty as well as more traditional concepts of fraud, it was believed that state court
determinations should prevail. As one commentator succinctly stated: "A desire to permit state
policy determinations to predominate may explain the reluctance of some [federal] courts to
expand further the application of Rule 10b-5 to mismanagement." Jacobs, The Role of Securities
GOING PRIVATE
exclusive jurisdiction over substantive fiduciary corporation law."
However, the Second Circuit approach changed dramatically in early 1976
with Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.12 Minority shareholders of Concord
Fabrics, a New York corporation, challenged the legality of a proposed
long-form merger 13 between Concord and AFW, a "shell" corporation which
had been formed by Concord's majority shareholders for the sole purpose of
returning the company to private ownership. In enjoining the proposed
merger as a violation of section 10(b) and rule lob-5, the court held that
although the merger fully complied with the applicable New York statute and
the federal disclosure laws, it nevertheless constituted a scheme by the
controlling shareholders to defraud the corporation and the minority share-
holders to whom they owed fiduciary obligations "with no justification in the
form of a valid corporate purpose."' 4 Five days later, the Second Circuit, in
Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., IS upheld a similar claim challenging the
legality of a state-sanctioned short-form merger since the majority sharehold-
ers had committed a breach of their fiduciary duty to the minority by
consummating the merger without any justifiable business purpose.' 6 In so
holding, the court strongly denied the power of the states "to preempt
Congress in the creation of substantive rights and remedies arising from
purchases and sales of securities .... "17
Although the problems of federalism in corporation and securities law have
been discussed elsewhere, 18 the standards espoused by the Second Circuit in
Green and Marshel seemingly undercut to an unprecedented degree the role of
the state courts and legislatures in defining corporate fiduciary standards.' 9
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 27, 33
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs]. See Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir.
1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5); Lewis v. Siegel,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,992 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Kerr, Going Private:
Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 Sec. Reg. L.J. 33, 57 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Kerr].
11. "'The primary source of the law in this area ever remains that of the State which created
the corporation.' " Borden, supra note 3, at 1037, quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 85 (1969); see Jacobs, supra note 10, at 30;
New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1120.
12. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1976) (No. 75-1782).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. 533 F.2d at 1280-82.
15. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No.
75-1753).
16. Id. at 1291.
17. Id. at 1286.
18. See, e.g., Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-
Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Bloomenthal]; Cary, supra note 3;
Cohen, supra note 3; Fleischer, supra note 3; Note, Civil Liability under Section 10B and Rule
1OB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 680-89 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Privity].
19. Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at
14, col. 2; Greene, supra note 4, at 498 n.37 ("the Second Circuit's decision [in Green) sanctions
1976]
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The two decisions, however, perhaps raise more questions than they at-
tempted to answer.
20
This Note will examine Green and Marshel in light of the expanding federal
role in corporate securities law; review state and federal "going private" cases
which have followed Green and Marshel in order to illumine the relationship
between state and federal laws and remedies and evaluate their responsive-
ness (or lack of it) to "going private" problems; and briefly examine section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 in order to determine whether they provide a substruc-
ture adequate to carry the weight of the federal standards adopted in Green
and Marshel, or whether the intricacies of the "going private" process call for
a different approach.
II. PRE-Green AND Marshel DEVELOPMENTS:
GOING PRIVATE AND RULE 10b-5
An examination of federal decisions preceding Green and Marshel reveals
two countervailing trends: an increasing liberalization of the elements tradi-
tionally required to prove fraud;2 1 and reluctance by the federal courts to
define section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 liability in terms of corporate fiduciary
duties, 22 an historically exclusive state concern. 23
an unprecedented intrusion of federal securities laws into traditional areas of state regulation.").
It has been argued that concern over displacement of state corporate behavior law is "misplaced"
(Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 349) since the federal courts are not preempting the state courts'
jurisdiction (Cohen, supra note 3, at 594) but rather "[occupying] an otherwise vacant niche."
Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1151. It is unlikely, however, that these commentators would adhere
to this position today, at least as far as Green is concerned.
20. For example, what is a justifiable corporate purpose? Will minority shareholders always
have standing to bring such suits? When, if ever, will a showing of deception be required? What
remedies will be appropriate if liability is found? Is there a federal right to continue as a minority
shareholder in perpetuity? More importantly, do the federal standards for "going private"
enunciated in Green and Marshel represent the outer limits of federal expansion into the
corporate responsibility area, or will they be treated as jumping off points for even greater federal
intervention in what has been traditionally an exclusive state concern?
21. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) (reliance on
misrepresentation need not be shown); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 192 (1963), rev'g 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (specific Intent
to defraud not required); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967); O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) (strict common law deception need not be shown).
22. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972) (the rule does not protect shareholders
from overreaching by majority absent nondisclosure); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d
Cir. 1964) (the rule does not "mandate [inquiry] into every allegation of breach of fiduciary duty
respecting . . . securities."); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 462-63 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). But see Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 880 (5th Cir. 1970)
(distinguishing O'Neill in reversing district court finding that corporate mismanagement Is not
covered by rule lOb-5); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) ("controlling influence" by majority of board constitutes rule
lOb-5 fraud); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1964) (corporation may be
defrauded by a majority of its own directors).
23. See note 11 supra.
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In the landmark case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 24 the controlling
shareholder, who also controlled Newport's board of directors, had sold his
Newport stock at twice its market value to a second company in an alleged
scheme to allow the latter to use Newport as a captive steel supply source. In
upholding the district court's ismissal of the minority shareholders' deriva-
tive claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud in failing to disclose the
purpose of the stock sale, the Second Circuit held that rule 10b-5 was "aimed
only at 'a fraud perpetrated upon the purchaser or seller' of securities and...
[has] no relation to breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting
in fraud upon those who were not purchasers or sellers."2 s The court further
found that section 10(b) was intended as a remedy only for that fraud
"usually" associated with the purchase or sale of securities, and not for
corporate mismanagement. 26 This dual holding-the strict purchaser/seller
standing requirement, and the "usual" fraud limitation-became a barrier to
federal examination of corporate fiduciary standards for many years, particu-
larly in the Second Circuit.
Erosion of the standing requirement began in Pettit v. American Stock
Exchange.2 7 There, in a rule 10b-5 suit alleging fraud in the distribution and
sale of stock, the district court granted standing to a corporate trustee in order
"to accomplish what Congress intended-the protection of the integrity of
stock transactions. 2 8 Shortly afterwards, the Second Circuit decided Ruckle
v. Roto American Corp.,2 9 a shareholders' derivative suit alleging that the
board of directors' failure to disclose pertinent information regarding a
corporate stock issuance constituted fraud under rule lob-5. In sustaining the
claim, the court specifically found that a corporation's issue of its own stock
constituted a "sale" for 10b-5 purposes, 30 and that a majority of its directors
could conceivably defraud the corporation. 3'
Thus, while Pettit may have relaxed Birnbaum's strict standing require-
ment by expanding the class of cases entertained pursuant to section l(b) and
rule 10b-5, Ruckle, by refusing to impute the directors' knowledge to the
corporation, recognized that the corporate entity exists primarily for its
shareholders. Undeniably, the interests of directors are not always identical to
those of shareholders. To a certain extent, then, the Second Circuit firmly
applied the established principle-corporate directors and controlling share-
holders owing a fiduciary du.y to minority shareholders 32 -to a rule 10b-5
action.
24. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
25. Id. at 463.
26. Id. at 463-64.
27. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28. Id. at 28.
29. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
30. Id. at 27-28.
31. Id. at 29.
32. "A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of
stockholders. . . .Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and
where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on
the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
19761
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The circuit court substantially completed this erosion process when it
rendered its decisions in A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow33 and Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co. 34 In Perlow, the Second Circuit, reversing the district court's
holding that rule 10b-5 protection did not extend to non-investors, 35 stated
that such a limitation "would not be in harmony with the Supreme Court's
postulation that the securities laws should be construed 'not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate . . . [their] remedial purposes.' "36 Vine
involved a rule lob-5 complaint by a minority shareholder in a New York
corporation which had been merged into a larger company under the New
York short-form merger statute. 37 Under the terms of the merger, the plaintiff
would be required to receive cash for his shares either at the merger-dictated
price, or that set in a state appraisal proceeding. 38 Since Vine had neither sold
nor surrendered his shares by the commencement of the suit, the district
court, asserting lack of standing, dismissed the complaint. 39 The Second
Circuit, holding that the plaintiff necessarily at some time must become a
party to a "sale," reversed the lower court and opined that requiring one to
sell his shares prior to commencing a suit "seems a needless formality."'4
The liberalization of the Birnbaum standing requirement evidenced by
these cases was, per force, matched by a liberalization in the construction of
rule lob-5's "in connection with" language. Although purchases or sales of
stock were at the heart of the alleged "fraudulent" activity in Pettit and
Perlow, this was true to a much lesser extent in Vine and Ruckle. In those
cases, the directors' questionable conduct and the propriety of the merger
were, arguably, at the core of the respective complaints; the issuance or sale
of stock were mere incidents of the transactions. 4 1
The increasing willingness by courts to construe liberally the "in connection
with" language of rule 10b-5 received impetus from the Supreme Court's
inherent fairness . . . ." Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (citations omitted); see Mason
v. Pewabic Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1890); cf. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
911 (1961).
33. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
34. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
35. 375 F.2d at 396.
36. Id., quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
37. 374 F.2d at 631; see note 5 supra.
38. State appraisal statutes typically provide a procedure by which a dissenting minority
shareholder who must surrender or sell his shares may apply to the court to insure that he
receives adequate compensation for the shares. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623 (McKinney
1963), as amended, § 623(d), (g), (k) (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976). The adequacy of the
appraisal remedy as a correction for "going private" abuses, has, however, been seriously
questioned; see notes 120-24 infra and accompanying text.
39. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 252 F. Supp. 212, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 374 F.2d
627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
40. 374 F.2d at 634.
41. See New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1108-10. At least one commentator has suggested that
extending rule lob-5 liability to transactions in which the purchase or sale of securities was
merely incidental, would be an unjustifiable undercutting of state interests. Privity, supra note
18, at 681-82.
[Vol. 45
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decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.42
This case involved a scheme by an insurance company's sole stockholder to
sell its interest in the company to a third party who, in turn, used the assets
(bonds) of the company, rather than private funds, to complete the deal. A
unanimous Court held that the defrauded corporation was a "person" for rule
lob-5 purposes and had standing to bring suit,43 even though it had not
"sold" stock in the ordinary sense, and the transaction was not implemented
through a national securities exchange or organized market." Impliedly, the
decision represented the death-knell of a strict standing requirement when the
Court announced that "[slince there was a 'sale' of a security and since fraud
was used 'in connection with' it, there is redress under § 10(b) . . .,.
Birnbaum's second holding-that 10b-5 was not intended to remedy corpo-
rate mismanagement, but limited to fraud "usually" found in connection with
securities transactions--proved to be a greater obstacle. Over strong objec-
tions from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Second
Circuit early held that, absent nondisclosure, allegations that corporate insid-
ers used corporate funds solely for obtaining greater control did not state a
federal claim under rule 10b-5. 46 Relying upon Birnbaum, the court viewed
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as imposing only an affirmative duty of "honest
disclosure";4 7 anything beyond was, at best, a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty remediable only under state law.48 The question of what remedy would
exist should the applicable state law disallow actions for such breach, absent
deception, remained unresolved. 4 9
Although stating that deception was required to sustain a rule 10b-5 claim,
the court added that it "need not be deception in any restricted common law
42. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Bankers Life "has definitely taken an expansionist approach to the
interpretation of [rule lab-5]' by recognizing a federal claim where the connection between the
fraud and the transaction questioned is "tenuous." O'Neal & Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for
Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
327, 341 (1975).
43. 404 U.S. at 9-14.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id. at 12. Although it can now be said that Birnbaum's" 'bu)er-seller requirement... has
been much reduced' " (Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)), it has not been entirely repudiated. The attitude of the federal
courts today was best summed up by the Sixth Circuit in James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d
944 (6th Cir. 1973): "[XV]here the alleged deceptive practices have led ... the shareholder into a
completed transaction giving rise to a § 10(b) suit, the courts have generally inclined to a logical
and flexible construction of the term 'purchaser-seller' in order to accommodate the avowed
purpose of § 10(b) of protecting the investing public and of ensuring honest dealings in securities
transactions." Id. at 948.
46. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964). But cf. United Funds, Inc. v. Carter
Prods., Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 91,288 (Baltimore City Cir.
Ct. 1963).
47. 339 F.2d at 767.
48. Id. at 767-68.
49. See notes 115-31 infra and accompanying text for a general discussion of the adequacy or
inadequacy of state statutory and equitable remedies.
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sense; one of the central purposes of federal securities legislation would
otherwise be seriously vitiated."5 0 Thus, arguably, the Second Circuit at-
tempted to modify Birnbaum's "usual" fraud limitation by expanding the
concept of deception actionable under the rule. 5' It was not until its decision
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,52 however, that the prescription against
breach of fiduciary duty as a rule 10b-S violation was seriously shaken.
Schoenbaum involved an action brought by minority shareholders on behalf
of Banff Oil Ltd. Through successful tender offers, Aquitaine Company of
Canada had acquired control both of Banff and three of its eight directors.
Shortly after voting to sell a large block of Banff stock to Aquitaine at $1.35
per share, Banffs directors publicly announced a major oil discovery, causing
a marked increase in the stock's value. 53 The complaint alleged that
Aquitaine and the Banff directors, knowing of the oil discovery, had con-
spired to sell Banff stock at grossly inadequate prices in order to enrich
Aquitaine at the expense of Banff and its minority shareholders.5 4
Initially, the court held the complaint merely alleged breach of fiduciary
duty. 55 A rule 10b-5 claim was not maintainable absent a showing that the
corporation had been deceived (concededly, the directors were in possession of
the material facts) or that the transaction was not conducted at arm's-
length.5 6 The dissent argued, however, that
[the majority does] not absolve the defendants of fraud by calling their action a breach
of fiduciary duty. There is no reason for making that distinction since such a breach of
fiduciary duty as is here alleged clearly constitutes fraud.
50. 339 F.2d at 768.
51. According to one commentator, "O'Neill ... may soon be written off as an aberration."
Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 339. The decision exemplified the trend of federal courts to fail
"to recognize the 'fraud' provisions of Rule 10b-5 and [rely] solely on the disclosure provision...
[which resulted in] reading those provisions out of the statute." Brodsky, State Going-Private
Laws--Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 14, col. 1. Later courts, unwilling to
overrule O'Neill, were forced to adopt "strained rationalizations in order to find such deception."
Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 375.
For example, in Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965),
the court found that "[plaintiff... was the subject of deception for when she acquired her stock
she did so upon the justifiable assumption that any merger would deal with her fairly .... " Id.
at 375. And in Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967), the court held that although no misrepresentations had been made to the plaintiff, the fact
that fraud on other shareholders resulted eventually in the plaintiff being forced to sell his shares
"justiflied] holding that fraud on A is 'in connection with' the forced sale by B" and stated a 10b-S
claim. Id. at 635.
Professor Bloomenthal suggests that the Voege and Vine courts simply should have held that
where fiduciaries take unfair advantage of minority shareholders who are forced to sell their
shares to the majority, no deception should be required. Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 375.
52. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
53. The stock increased from its original value of $1.35 to $18.00 per share. Id. at 217-18.
54. Id. at 218.
55. Schoenbaun v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 21S (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 39S U.S. 906 (1969).
56. Id. at 209, 211-13.
[Vol. 45
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.. . In order to establish fraud it is surely not necessary to show that the directors
deceived themselves. It must be enough to show that they deceived the shareholders,
the real owners of the property with which the directors were dealing."s
An en banc rehearing reversed the panel's earlier determination,58 but,
significantly, did not equate fraud with breach of fiduciary duty. 59 Instead,
relying largely upon Ruckle, the court held that Aquitaine had exercised a
"controlling influence" 60 in causing the Banff stock to be issued for grossly
inadequate consideration and therefore was an "act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud" 6' under lob-5.
This position highlights what may be the most significant contribution of
the Schoenbaum decision-a shift in focus from the strictly legal propriety of
the securities transaction, to the motives and fiduciary duties of the group
controlling the transaction.
However, if Schoenbaum, heralded for introducing what has been com-
monly called the "new fraud, '62 seemed to imply that the Second Circuit
might explicitly make fiduciary duty the basis of a rule lb-5 action, Popkin
v. Bishop63 dispelled such hopes. In that case, minority shareholders of Bell
Corporation claimed that proposed merger terms between Bell and Equity
Corporation, which controlled 51.7 per cent of the outstanding Bell stock,
were unfair to all of the Bell shareholders except Equity. Although there was
no allegation of misrepresentation or nondisclosure either in the merger
proposal or the joint proxy statement,64 the plaintiffs urged that rule lOb-5
" 'is more than a [mere] disclosure provision' and that ... [it] affords minority
shareholders protection against overreaching by majority shareholders and
directors '[w]hether the facts remain hidden from the minority or are ulti-
mately revealed in a Proxy Statement.' "65 The Second Circuit rejected the
argument by distinguishing corporate transactions requiring, under applicable
state law, shareholder approval (as was true in Popkin) from those which do
not.66 Since rule lob-5 was "designed principally to impose a duty to disclose
and inform," 67 once shareholder approval had been "fairly sought and freely
given, the . . . federal interest is at an end. Underlying questions of the
57. Id. at 214-15 (Hays, J., dissenting).
58. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
59. Indeed, the court "carefully avoided stating that wrongful conduct alone is actionable
under lOb-5.' Greene, supra note 4, at 498 n.37. Thus, although the Green court relied
extensively on Schoenbaum, as a matter of fact it went far beyond the careful holding enunciated
in that case; see notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
60. 405 F.2d at 219.
61. Id. at 219-20.
62. See Jacobs, supra note 10, at 59; New Fraud, supra note 2, passim.
63. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
64.. Id. at 718.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 719.
67. Id. at 719-20.
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wisdom of such transactions or even their fairness become tangential at best
to federal regulation. '68
Plaintiffs also contended that where shareholder approval of the proposed
merger is, in essence, meaningless (Equity controlled outright 51.7 per cent of
the Bell stock), any distinction between short and long-form mergers is
irrelevant, since the effectiveness of the minority's role is illusory. 69 The
court, in rejecting this argument, stated that plaintiffs could sue to enjoin the
merger in state court, the "federal injunctive remedy . . . offer[ing] . . . no
greater protection. '70
With respect to long-form mergers, the Popkin court thus precluded federal
scrutiny into the intrinsic fairness of an insider-controlled "going private"
transaction 7T'-thereby repudiating the suggestion implicitly raised by Scho-
enbaum. Its sweeping statements regarding the availability of federal relief
under lob-5 72 lose impact, unless there is deception or nondisclosure of
material facts.
Thus, before Green and Marshel were decided, two distinct trends were
evident in the Second Circuit's treatment of claims under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. First, the court was reluctant to scrutinize the motives, interests or
fiduciary duties of corporate insiders, even if overreaching or breach of duty
were alleged. 73 The court examined fraudulent activity only to that extent
necessary to determine whether there was full disclosure of all material
facts. 74 Deception would sustain allegations of fraud;7 S unfairness in the offer
or merger was not a federal concern. 76 Second, three important developments
evolved: fraud need not be of the "typical garden variety";7 7 the class of
68. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
69. It has been stated that "stockholder approval as a protective procedure . . . . affords no
protection when a parent combines with a subsidiary and the parent owns the amount of the
subsidiary's stock required to approve the transaction." Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares In
Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 299-300 (1974) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein]. This may be true even if the parent owns less than
the required amount, due to 1) the atomized nature of the minority, 2) the salability of stock, 3)
lack of participation in merger discussions and 4) the fact that the timing of the transaction Is
dictated by management. Id. at 300. But see Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d I (2d Cir.
1971).
70. 464 F.2d at 720.
71. In Lewis v. Siegel, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,992 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), the court rejected the contention that Popkin applies only in "merger or other situations
where stockholder approval has been required and given pursuant to state corporation law." Id.
at 93,985. It further held that there is no exception to the rule 10b-5 nondisclosure requirement
"[aibsent any allegation that disclosure of relevant information was 'in a real sense' withheld from
the public .... Id. It has been suggested that together, Popkin and Lewis "appear effectively to
bar federal review of take-out transactions in the absence of a disclosure violation," Borden,
supra note 3, at 1034.
72. See 464 F.2d at 718.
73. See notes 24-26, 46-48, and 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 47, 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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persons and types of transactions covered by rule 10b-5 had been greatly
expanded;78 and finally, under Schoenbaunt's "controlling influence" stan-
dard, the court recognized a need to protect minority shareholders from
corporate insiders seeking to take advantage of their control to the detriment
of the minority.79
III. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.: FmuciARY DUTY
AND THE LONG-FORM MERGER
The facts of Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp.80 are not complicated. In 1968,
Concord Fabrics, a privately owned corporation, made a successful public
offering, the previous owners retaining 68 per cent of the now publicly issued
stock. In 1975, desiring to return the company to private ownership, the
controlling shareholders formed AFW Fabric Corporation and transferred
their Concord shares to AFW in exchange for 100 per cent of the new AFW
stock. AFW's sole asset was, after this exchange, its 68 per cent interest in
Concord. The new corporation then made a tender offer for all publicly
owned Concord shares. Its purchase offer accurately stated that, whether or
not the tender offer was successful, AFW intended to merge with Concord at
the expiration of the offer. Under the terms of the merger, all publicly held
Concord shares would be cancelled, their holders to receive $3 per share, the
identical price quoted in the tender offer. The offer also stated that under
New York law the merger could, and would, be consummated whether or not
the minority shareholders approved. 8 ' The plaintiff, a dissenting minority
shareholder, sought to enjoin the proposed merger on the grounds that it
would both violate the provisions of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, and
constitute fraud and breach of fiduciary duty under New York law.82 AFW
thereupon withdrew its tender offer and mailed out a proxy statement stating
78. See notes 21, 27-31, and 33-40 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 52-61 supra and accompanying text.
80. 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1976) (No. 75-1782).
81. Id. at 1278-79.
82. The merger had been temporarily enjoined by a New York court in an action brought by
the state Attorney General pursuant to the Martin Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 353 (McKinney
1968), which prohibits fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't 1975). The state court decision stated that
federal securities laws "do not seem sufficiently broad to deal with the problem of going private"
(id. at 123, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 552), but that state law would enjoin the transaction regardless of
full disclosure since it was "disquietingly evident.., that a group of insiders who are directing
the reacquisition program . . . are the very ones who made the company public originally .
Adding to the odium of the scheme is that fact that no real corporate purpose has been
demonstrated and that the credit of a now public corporation will be used to finance a merger for
the benefit of a private group." Id. at 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 554. But see Beloff v Consolidated
Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.2d 561, 564 (1949) (merged corporation's shareholder's only
right is to have value of his holding protected); Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc
988, 993, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 57 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (bad faith in invoking merger statute raises no
issue of illegality). See generally Brodsky, 'Going Private,' 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1976, at 1, col.
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that the merger would go through, and that its sole purpose was to return the
company to private ownership.
8 3
The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and
held that since the tender offer and proxy statement fully disclosed all
material facts, no federal claim would lie.8 4 The Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the proposed merger did constitute a violation of section 10(b)
and rule lob-5. Two factors were determinative: the controlling shareholders,
having taken advantage of public financing in 1968, were using corporate
funds to squeeze-out minority shareholders at a price and time determined
solely by them;"- and the merger benefitted only the controlling sharehold-
ers.8 6 When viewed together, these factors constituted "a scheme to defraud
[the] corporation and the minority shareholders to whom [the controlling
shareholders] owe fiduciary obligations by causing Concord to finance the
liquidation of the minority's interest with no justification in the form of a
valid corporate purpose. '8 7 Although acknowledging that rule 10b-5 does not
extend to corporate mismanagement, the court found that in the instant case a
purchase and sale of securities "is at the heart of the fraudulent scheme."8 8
While this may in a sense be true, clearly the "fraud" was not intrinsic to the
purchase or sale per se, but rather to the merger itself, in the form of "an
attempt by the majority stockholders to utilize corporate funds for strictly
personal benefit."8 9 Thus, it may be contended that Marshel reaffirms that
shift in focus from the legality of the securities transaction itself (arguably the
intent of rule 10b-5) to the concept of fiduciary responsibility suggested by
Vine, Ruckle and Schoenbaum but abruptly stifled by Popkin.
Marshel is striking in two other aspects. First, AFW argued that the
purpose of the merger was irrelevant, since its consummation would fully
comply with the applicable long-form merger statute. Moreover, the state
appraisal remedy was adequate and exclusive. In rejecting both contentions,
the court held that whether the merger was valid under state law was not
a question it need decide, 90 and that the existence of a state remedy does
not negate federally created rights, 9' including injunctive relief where
83. 533 F.2d at 1279.
84. Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734, 738-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1976) (No.
75-1782).
85. 533 F.2d at 1280; see note 82 supra.
86. 533 F.2d at 1280-81.
87. Id. at 1282.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1280. The court's disclaimer notwithstanding, "it is easier to find a Rule lob-S
violation in a transaction which the state court has found to be 'fraudulent' and in violation of
state law then [sic] it is in a transaction . . . in . . .which the Court assumes compli[ancel with
state law." Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at
14, col. 2; see note 82 supra.
91. 533 F.2d at 1281. See Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 718 (2d Cir. 1972); Vine v.
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proper.92 Second, and more importantly, the court dismissed defendants'
contention that full disclosure of all material facts bars a claim under section
10(b). 9 3 Popkin was distinguished in that the propriety of the merger was not
challenged, but rather the fairness of the exchange ratios; whereas in Marshel,
the fraudulent scheme was inherent in the merger itself. 94 Thus the court
concluded that "it would surely be anomalous to hold that a cause of action
[sic] is stated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the fraudulent conduct...
includes deception but that similarly fraudulent practices carried out with
prior disclosure to the helpless victim do not give rise to a Rule 10(b)-5 [sic]
claim. '9
5
IV. Green v. Sante Fe Industries, Inc.: FIDUCIARY DUTY
AND THE SHORT-FORi MERGER
Unlike Marshel, Green v. Sante Fe Industries, Inc. 96 involved a Delaware
short-form merger. 97 Sante Fe Natural Resources owned 95 per cent of Kirby
Lumber Company, a Delaware corporation. After forming a "shell" corpora-
tion, Sante Fe transferred its Kirby stock to the "shell" in exchange for 100
per cent of its stock. Under Delaware law, a corporation owning at least 90
per cent of another may merge with that corporation without shareholder
approval. 98 Accordingly, a merger was effected and Kirby's minority
shareholders were informed that under the terms of the already consummated
merger, they would receive $150 per share for their stock, or, alternatively,
could seek appraisal under the state statute. Plaintiffs, Kirby minority
shareholders, sought to rescind the merger and recover money damages. They
alleged that the Delaware procedure is a device to defraud because it forces
minority shareholders to sell their shares for less than true value, and that,
even absent misrepresentation, the merger violated rule 10b-5 since it served
no valid corporate purpose. 99
As in Marshel, the lower court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
federal claim. 100 Once again the Second Circuit reversed and held that "a
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967h McClure v.
Borne Chem. n:o., 292 F.2d 824, 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
92. 533 F.2d at 1281. Granting injunctive relief, of course, "is extraordinary relief" and
requires showings of irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, balancing of hard-
ships, and an inadequate remedy at law. Sanders v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 473 F.2d 244 (2d
Cir. 1972).
93. 533 F.2d at 1282.
94. Id. This distinction has been criticized as a matter of semantics not justifying the result.
Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d - , 383
N.Y.S.2d 472, 478 (Sup. CL 1976).
95. 533 F.2d at 1282.
96. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No.
75-1753).
97. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1975).
98. Id.
99. 533 F.2d at 1288.
100. Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, S33 F.2d 1283
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976) (No. 75-1753).
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complaint alleges a claim under Rule lob-5 when it charges, in connection
with a... short-form merger, that the majority has committed a breach of its
fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the
merger without any justifiable business purpose.' 0 Echoing Marshel, the
court emphasized the fact that corporate funds had been used to finance the
expulsion of the minority, the benefit accruing solely to the controlling
insiders.102 The court further stated that where a rule lob-5 claim is based on
breach of fiduciary duty, there need be no allegation of misrepresentation or
nondisclosure.' 0 3 In so holding, the court turned Popkin to its own advantage
by construing that decision to require lack of disclosure where shareholder
approval was necessary. The implication, therefore, is that where no approval
is required, nondisclosure need not be shown in a rule lob-5 claim. 10 4
[I]t is the merger and the undervaluation which constitute the fraud, and not whether
or not the majority determines to lay bare their real motives. If there is no valid
corporate purpose for the merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to
the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct. 10 -
The court declined to decide whether the inevitability of approval made any
nondisclosure requirement illusory.10 6
Perhaps even more significant than its finding of fraud in the absence of
nondisclosure was the court's reaction to the unique allegation that the
101. 533 F.2d at 1291 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1290; see text accompanying note 89 supra.
103. 533 F.2d at 1287. In a vehement dissent, Judge Moore found this "an untenable
hypothesis" (id. at 1301), calling the majority's reasoning "legal legerdemain." Id. at 1304.
104. Id. at 1291-92. The reasoning behind this statement is rather ambiguous, particularly
since no showing of nondisclosure was required in Marshel, a case in which shareholder approval
was required. The fact that the minority did not have enough votes to stop the merger there may
have been significant.
It is interesting to note that neither Green nor Marshel expressly overruled Popkin. That fact
has been determinative in at least one federal case which held that breach of fiduciary duty was
not actionable under rule lob-5 as long as the merger was a "true combining" of business; see note
155 infra. On the other hand, it has been stated that by Green and Marshel, "Popkin has been
overruled sub silentio . . . ." Greene, supra note 4, at 498 n.37.
105. 533 F.2d at 1292.
106. Id.; see note 69 supra. Popkin was also distinguished in that there was a business
purpose for the merger so strong as to be "compelling" since the merger was part of a
court-ordered settlement agreement. Id. at 1291.
What will constitute a justifiable corporate purpose for purposes of defining federal "going
private" standards is, of course, one of the main questions left unanswered by Green and
Marshel. Although such a standard has been suggested (Note, Going Private, 84 Yale L.J. 903,
931 (1975)), a "compelling" purpose such as the Green court found in Popkin is probably too
restrictive a test. Suggested alternatives have been a "plausible" purpose other than the elimina-
tion of minority shareholders (Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1204 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vorenberg]), "commercial"
corporate purpose associated with immediate business advantage (rejected as too narrow in
Borden, supra note 3, at 1022-23), and "substantial" corporate purpose, with the burden of proof
on the fiduciaries to show that "any benefit to [them] would be incidental." Kerr, supra note 10,
at 59.
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applicable state short-form merger statute was, in itself, a device to defraud
since notice is dispensed with, the stock is undervalued, and no corporate
purpose for the merger is served. 10 7 Although compliance with state law had
never been considered a defense to a federal action,108 no federal court had
ever taken the opportunity to determine the effect of state law on federal
"going private" standards, mainly because it was consistently held that there
was no federal claim absent nondisclosure.
The Green court, therefore, struck a blow for the power of the federal
courts by holding that
the states have no power to preempt Congress in the creation of substantive rights and
remedies arising from purchases and sales of securities in interstate commerce ....
The remedies available to redress violations under the Securities Exchange Act are
supplementary to those provided by the states and they may not be abrogated merely
by the coincidental availability of an alternate or corollary state remedy.... [Tlhe fact
that a shareholder claiming fraud both in the consummation of a merger not based on
any justifiable corporate purpose and in the undervaluation of his shares may under
state law only resort to an appraisal proceeding that merely ameliorates the undervalu-
ation does not foreclose the right of the Congress and the federal courts to provide that
claimant an additional right and remedy to redress any injury flowing from a fraud
inherent in the merger itself.'0 9
By defining the relationship between federal and state remedies in the "going
private" area in this language, the court strongly indicated that federal
injunctive relief is not merely a federal analogue to the state appraisal
procedure, but a separate federal weapon which could be utilized to remedy
fraud inherent in the merger itself. Earlier decisions-Perow, Schoenbaum
and perhaps even Marshel-left the impression that they were only superim-
posing a federal remedy on an already state-created one. The Green court,
however, addressed itself to wrongs never contemplated by the state appraisal
procedures'1 0 when it distinguished simple undervaluation from the fraud
inherent in the merger. Whether the ultimate relief awarded for such
"fiduciary-fraud" will differ from the monetary figure set in an appraisal
proceeding was not discussed by the court."'
107. A similar claim was made in Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc 988, 115
N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. 1952), in which the plaintiffs contended that the bad faith of the
fiduciaries in using a state statute to eliminate minority shareholders at an inadequate price
tainted the statute itself with illegality. Id. at 991, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 55. The court found that as
long as the depreciation of the plaintiffs' stock was remediable under the appraisal procedure,
there was no basis for injunctive relief. Id. at 992, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
108. "[A fiduciary] cannot use his power for ... personal advantage and to the detriment of
the stockholders ... no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements" Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); accord, Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir- 1972)
109. 533 F.2d at 1286 (emphasis added). The dissent, however, was seriously alarmed by this
usurpation of the state's corporate laws and "the astonishing and impermissible establishment of a
federal common law of corporations." Id. at 1304 (Moore, J., dissenting); see note 103 supra.
110. See notes 118-19 infra and accompanying text.
111. According to one commentator, Green suggests that revaluation of the surrendered
shares, and not injunctive relief, is the proper remedy. Brodsky, State Going-Private Laws-
Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 14, col. 4. This view seems borne out by a later
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Whether Green and Marshel have in fact created a new federal remedy for
"going private" abuses ' 2 will be a matter of interpretation as future cases
arise. Compared with prior law, they at least leave no doubt as to the
liberalization of standing requirements and expand the definitions of fraud
espoused by Perlow and Schoenbaum. Perhaps more importantly, they bring
to the center of the federal stage the concept of breach of fiduciary duty as a
basis for finding a rule 10b-5 fraud. They also dramatically demonstrate the
Second 'Circuit's willingness to find liability where the fraud is found not in
the purchase or sale of securities per se, but in the essential unfairness of a
transaction whose relationship to the securities market may be only tangen-
tial."13 Moreover, this new concept is now recognized as one of overriding
federal interest, which cannot be abridged or delimited by the existence of
state law in the area." 4
V. -Green AND Marshel AS RESPONSES
TO INADEQUATE STATE REMEDIES
Since corporate taxes are an important source of revenue, many state laws
governing the regulation of corporations have been enacted to make incorpo-
ration in the home state as attractive as possible."15 Consequently, stockhol-
der protection was considered only a secondary concern."16 These corporate
laws, usually taking the form of "enabling" acts, have "watered the rights of
shareholders vis-ai-vis management down to a thin gruel." 17 In recognition of
this fact, many states have created the appraisal procedure in order to provide
some balance to the broad powers conferred on management by the enabling
acts. 18 These laws provide a partial remedy for shareholders who are forced
to receive cash for their stock by assuring, theoretically at least, that full value
is given.' 19
Second Circuit case, Merrit v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1976),
which so interpreted Green and Marshel.
112. "Green and Marshel when read together, lead to the conclusion that both long and
short-form mergers designed to eliminate minority positions with no justifiable corporate purpose
violate Rule 10b-5 although full disclosure is made and the price set by the majority is fair to the
minority." Brodsky, Going Private-Is It Over?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 3. "(It Is
safe to say that the vast majority of corporate lawyers would have advised their clients that the
merger in Green did not violate state or federal law." Id. at 2, col. 1.
113. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
114. See note 109 supra. Undoubtedly, it was "the federal court's skepticism and growing
dissatisfaction with state remedies, particularly appraisal" which was the prime motivation
behind the Green decision. Greene, supra note 4, at 499 n.37.
115. Cary, supra note 3, at 665-66.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 666.
118. "Under [state] statutes there is considerable leeway for majority shareholders to take
unfair advantage of a minority.
The risk of hardship or injustice . . . is mitigated somewhat, however, by so-called 'appraisal
statutes .... " O'Neal & Derwin, supra note 4, at 62 (footnote omitted).
119. It has been noted, however, that "resort to appraisal will ... often give the stockholder
less than his stock is worth." Vorenberg, supra note 106, at 1201.
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Appraisal, as the exclusive remedy to the possible abuses in "going private"
transactions, has been poignantly criticized. The proceedings, even if con-
ducted fairly, tend to undervalue the true worth of the shares' 20 and are often
time consuming, particularly in states requiring dissenting shareholders ini-
tially to demand satisfaction from the board of directors. 2 1 Typical state
statutes require a plaintiff to post security for costs as a condition to commenc-
ing the suit. 12 More importantly, the appraisal procedure fails to remedy the
minority's lack of participation in the merger proposal, timing or terms, 2 3 nor
does it adequately compensate for their elimination from further participation
in the company's growth.' 24
Some state courts, or federal courts guided by state law, have shown a
willingness to provide injunctive relief in "going private" cases, even where
appraisal rights exist. For example, in Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., ' 25 a
leading Fifth Circuit case decided on Georgia law, the court enjoined a
proposed merger since its sole purpose was to eliminate the plaintiff's interest
in the corporation. The court found that the scheme constituted a device or
artifice to defraud and a breach of the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty
to the minority. 126
This willingness was also exhibited in a New Jersey decision. Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp.127 involved a proposed "going private" merger between
two corporations, one of which was a "shell" formed solely to effect the
merger. The court declined to follow Bryan's holding that a merger effected
solely to eliminate minority shareholders was a per se breach of fiduciary duty
where it complies with state law.' 28 Nevertheless, the merger was enjoined.
Noting the immediate financial gain accruing to the insiders as a result of the
merger and the large bonuses they awarded themselves shortly beforehand,' 29
the court held that "[a]t a minimum [the insiders'] conduct is subject to a
searching inquiry to determine whether it conforms to accepted concepts of
fairness and equity."' 30 Significantly, the court declined to presume a "going
120. Id.
121. See New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1120.
122. Id.; see McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 827-29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961).
123. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 69, at 304.
124. See O'Neal & Derwin, supra note 4, at 73 (appraisal cannot remedy shareholder's
dilution of proprietary interest or control); Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 69, at 305 (where
merger produces gains to company, appraisal does not allow eliminated minority to share in
same).
Even were the procedure an adequate one, some states either provide no appraisal right at all,
or are not aggressive in enforcing it. Cohen, supra note 3, at 59S-96; Fleischer, supra note 3, at
1153; New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1120-21.
125. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), aff'g 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D.
Ga. 1972).
126. Id. at 571.
127. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. 1975).
128. Id. at 47-48, 342 A.2d at 573.
129. Id. at 48, 342 A.2d at 573.
130. Id. at 49, 342 A.2d at 574.
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private" procedure was free from illegality simply because it complied with
the merger statute and the price paid was fair.' 3 '
Unfortunately, application of state "going private" standards has been
confusing at best. Hopefully, Green and Marshel will accelerate the trend of
commencing suits in federal, and not state court, especially since many factors
favor such a choice. There is need for uniformity and a single set of fiduciary
standards; 132 federal venue provisions and service rules are liberal; 133 the
federal judiciary enjoys a greater disinterest than its state brethren; 3 4 state
courts are inadequate to effectuate federal policy; 135 and federal courts are
now willing to intervene in "going private" transactions notwithstanding
complete compliance with state law and material disclosure.
VI. DEFINING AND APPLYING Green AND Marshel STANDARDS:
IMPACT OF AND ON STATE LAW
The effect Green and Marshel will have on the future roles of state and
federal courts in defining "going private" standards and remedying "going
private" abuses depends upon whether the federal role continues to expand. It
is possible that federal courts will borrow freely from state court standards, 3 6
and therefore Green and Marshel's effectiveness may hinge upon the forceful-
ness with which state courts enforce and define the fiduciary duties owed to
minority shareholders. On the other hand, federal courts may interpret and
apply Green and Marshel de novo, emphasizing a purely federal approach.
An examination of recent federal and state court decisions interpreting Green
and Marshel reveals widely varying standards depending upon a particular
court's approach.
In Box v. Northrop Corp., 137 a federal district court case, the plaintiff
alleged that as a result of two mergers, the last involving a "shell" corporation
and the Delaware short-form merger statute, his shareholder's equity in the
corporation had been reduced from 20 per cent to .257 per cent. 138 Plaintiff
charged violations of rule 10b-5 and state claims of breach of fiduciary duty in
that the sole purpose of the merger was to effect a squeeze-out. Ruling on
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a federal
131. Id. at 50, 342 A.2d at 574.
132. "[Tlhe policy of uniformity within the federal system is stronger than any policy of
conformity with local rules .... Congress intended uniform enforcement of rights arising under
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . ." McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 833 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961); see Bloomenthal, supra note 18, at 349-50; Cohen, supra
note 3, at 595; Privity, supra note 18, at 670.
133. Bromberg, supra note 4, § 2.7(3); Privity, supra note 18, at 670.
134. "[Flederal courts have a tradition of independence and impartiality . . . . [Federal
judges) do not resign to return to private practice and they would not entertain any feelings of
disloyalty even if they were aware that their state or region would suffer by their judgements."
Cary, supra note 3, at 695.
135. See New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1120-21; Privity, supra note 18, at 671.
136. See Borden, supra note 3, at 1038-39.
137. No. 74 Civ. 4373 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 26, 1976).
138. Id. at 4.
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claim, the court held that under Green, allegations of "breaches of fiduciary
duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure are sufficient to state a claim.' 39 The
court opined that a rule 10b-5 claim is sustained when, "in connection with a
... short-form merger, . . . the majority has committed a breach of its
fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the
merger without any justifiable business purpose.' 140
It is not clear from Northrop whether every breach of fiduciary duty, or
only one stemming from lack of any justifiable corporate purpose, will be
actionable. Arguably, the decision represents an expansion of Green not
intended by that court, since the minority shareholder was not totally
eliminated. However, a significant factor in the court's decision may have
been the extreme dissipation of the minority's equity-elimination in sub-
stance, though not in form.
In contrast to the liberalized federal view, a New York court, shortly after
the Marshel decision, refused to enjoin a proposed Delaware short-form
merger which would result in the elimination of the minority public sharehol-
ders.14 ' The court agreed that lack of a "proper corporate purpose" had
become a bar to short-form mergers which otherwise comply with state
law, 142 and conceded that a basis for state injunctive relief exists where
(1) fraud or illegality clearly [can] be shown, or (2) there has been concealment or
non-disclosure of material facts, or (3) . . . the merger is merely a device to deal
inequitably with the minority and has no valid business purpose, or (4)... there has
been a breach of fiduciary responsibility. 143
Nevertheless, it found that the instant case did not call for intervention since
"the merger . . . was not actuated solely by motives of personal greed";'
44
there was no "apparent effort to milk the assets";' 45 the price offered for the
cancelled shares was not "palpably] or gross[ly] undervalu[ed]"; 14 6 corporate
funds were not financing the acquisition; 47 there were legitimate business
purposes "over and above the self-interest of the investors, [which tend] to
negate" justifiable equitable intervention. 148
139. Id. at7. Contra, Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5), which refused to equate a breach of
fiduciary duty in formulating the terms of a merger proposal with fraud where there was no
showing of nondisclosure. Green was distinguished in that the state merger statute there required
no notice to the minority shareholders. Id. at 985-86.
140. No. 74 Civ. 4373, at 7 (citation omitted).
141. Tanzer Economic Assoc., Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., - Misc. 2d -,
383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
142. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
143. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
144. Id.
145. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
146. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
147. Id.
148. Id. at-, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 482. Factors constituting a "justifiable purpose" included:
improvement of management personnel and corporate planning; realization of savings by pooling
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The court also elaborated on the state's role in formulating "going private"
standards and refused to take into account "what a federal court might do if
Rule lob-5 were to be invoked.' 49 It expounded that "[w]hether a merger
meets the statutory and equitable requirements of state law is solely a matter
for the state courts."' 5 0 Additionally, the court evinced reluctance to "[act]
precipitously to upset a procedure which has been given express legislative
sanction,""' obviously disapproving of Green's superimposition of federal
standards on Delaware's statutorily sanctioned requirements. 15 2
The Second Circuit had occasion to review a related case in Merrit v.
Libby, McNeill & Libby, 153 an appeal from the denial of a preliminary
injunction of the Libby merger. In affirming the lower court, the appellate
court sharply delineated the situations in which Green and Marshel should be
applied and also shed light on the remedies they implied. The court adroitly
distinguished Green because an appeal from a dismissed complaint must be
construed in the appellant's favor,' 5 4 and differentiated Marshel in that the
instant case did not involve a situation
where a shell corporation is used as a conduit for a forced merger by the simple device
of transferring the shares owned in the transferor corporation to the transferee shell
and the controlling shareholders put up no money but use corporate funds for their
personal advantage." 5' It is also not a case where the defendants admit that their sole
management experience, raw material resources, warehousing facilities and advertising talent;
elimination of conflict of interests problems; diversification of products; and, significantly,
elimination of SEC compliance. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
Compliance with SEC registration and disclosure requirements is expensive and time consum-
ing, and, consequently, is one of the foremost incentives to return a corporation to private
ownership. Brodsky, Going Private-Is It Over?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
Typically, savings are estimated from $40,000 to $100,000 per year. Swanson, supra note 4, at
615. If the savings realized by "going private" constitute a justifiable corporate purpose, then
"Green may be avoided in virtually every case by proper pleading and the decision is a tempest in
a teapot." Brodsky, supra at 2, col. 2. There seems to be a general consensus that elimination of
the need for SEC compliance, by itself, will not be a sufficient purpose. Bryan v. Brock &
Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974), aff'g 343 F. Supp. 1062
(N.D. Ga. 1972); Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate
Responsibility, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, Nov. 20, 1974,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 80,010, at 84,699. See House of Adler,
Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,515 (SEC 1971) (no action letter).
But see Swanson, supra note 4, at 653.
149. - Misc. 2d at - , 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
150. Id. at -, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 383 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79 & n.1.
153. 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
154. Id. at 1312.
155. The court emphasized the fact that the corporation orchestrating the merger was not a
mere "conduit" for the purpose of forcing a merger financed with corporate funds, but rather an
active corporation involved in a business related to that of the merged corporation. Similar
reasoning was used in a recent Sixth Circuit case, Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978 (6th
Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3011 (U.S. July 6, 1976) (No. 76-5), which held
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motive is to rid themselves of the minority.' 5 6
Furthermore, valid business purposes justified defendants' conduct. "7
The heart of the decision, however, rested in the court's conviction that
damages at law could adequately compensate were plaintiffs to prevail on the
merits.'5 8 Simultaneously, the court did not intend to limit such damages to
those available through the state appraisal proceeding. "[The plaintiffs']
damages can be measured in terms different from those applicable in state
appraisal proceedings. Such restrictive theories of valuation are not binding
on federal courts when actual damages are sought for violations of the federal
securities laws."' 5 9 The court declined, however, to speculate on the proper
measure of damages.
1 60
Whether Merrit implies that Green and Marshel merely provide for a
federal appraisal proceeding when the merger is not consummated through a
shell and evinces a plausible business purpose, though inherently unfair, is
still too early to discern. It is at least possible to read Green without such
circumscription. 161
The Merrit limitation appears to have been more strictly applied in
Schulwolfv. Cerro Corp., 162 a New York case involving a proposed long-form
merger between two active corporations, forty-five per cent owned by the
Pritzker family. Under the terms of the merger, the Pritzkers would gain
control of the new corporation and all of its residual equity, while the
fifty-five per cent "minority" shareholders would receive preferred (non-
growth) stock in exchange for their common. The court refused to enjoin the
merger since "there is no violation of the fiduciary duty owed by the dominant
stockholders to the public stockholders if there is a proper corporate purpose
for the merger and there has been neither fraud, self-dealing nor price
manipulation and the alternatives afforded to the public shareholders are a
fair price fairly determined or the statutory right to an appraisal."'' 63 This is
particularly true where the public shareholders, owning 55 per cent of the
that a breach of fiduciary duty in formulating the terms of a merger between two Michigan
corporations did not raise a rule 10b-S claim. Id. at 984. Seizing upon the Second Circuit's failure
to overrule Popkin in either Green or Marshel, the court concluded that the latter were inapposite
where the merger is not a "sham transaction designed to expropriate the ownership interests of
the minority shareholders .... [but rather] a true combining of two businesses. . . ." Id. at 986.
The true combining/related business test was also adopted in Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.
2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); see note 165 infra and accompanying text. Interest-
ingly, New York's short-form merger statute, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905 (McKinney 1963),
eliminated its predecessor's requirement that the two corporations be engaged in similar or
incidental businesses. Whether Schulwolf modifies the present statute is an open question.
156. 533 F.2d at 1312.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1313.
159. Id. at 1314 (footnote omitted).
160. Id.
161. See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
162. 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
163. Id. at 297, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
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outstanding stock, have the power to veto the merger. 164 Furthermore,
combining the management and resources of related businesses so that
intercompany transactions benefit both, served a "proper corporate pur-
pose."' 6 5 Although corporate funds financed the merger, the court, neverthe-
less, found this irrelevant since the insiders were not the sole beneficiaries. 166
Schulwoif may be distinguished in that the public shareholders received
new stock for their shares and were not forced to receive cash-the situation
in Green and Marshel. Also, the fact that the Pritzker family controlled only
45 per cent of the corporation may have strongly influenced the court. 167
Nevertheless, if the definitions of "proper corporate purpose" espoused by the
New York judiciary are adopted by federal courts, 168 then applying the
"new" Green and Marshel standards simply may require adroit proxy state-
ment drafting so as to include any plausible business purpose. If Green stands
for the proposition that mergers are enjoinable only where the sole purpose is
insider benefit, as Schulwolf implies it does, then any allegation of savings, or
perhaps even administrative convenience, may be sufficient to save the
merger. This will be true even though the minority is forced out of their
company with their own funds at a price and time set by those realizing the
greatest benefit from the transaction. 169 Moreover, if application of Green and
Marshel is strictly limited to short-form mergers or those where approval is
virtually assured, or to situations in which the insider group is the one which
originally took the company public, then their effectiveness is severely cur-
tailed.' 70 Obviously, the degree to which state courts are allowed to define
164. Id. This is often an illusory power, however; see note 69 supra and accompanying text.
165. 86 Misc. 2d at 297-98, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 962; see note 148 supra.
166. 86 Misc. 2d at 298-99, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
167. Given the atomized nature of the remaining 55% and the practical difficulty of attaining
any sort of concerted action by the "majority," this seems, however, a distinction without
substance.
168. This approach has been recommended since the question is, or should be, one of state
law. Brodsky, Going Private, 175 N.Y.L.J., April 7, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
169. The question, obviously, is one of fairness. Green and Marshel did not, ostensibly, go so
far as to state that there exists "a right in virtual perpetuity to continue as [a minority
shareholder]. . . ." Brodsky, State Going Private Laws-Dead or Alive?, 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27,
1976, at 14, col. 3. That such a right exists where the shareholders' interest is compensable has
long been denied. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (N.D.
Fla. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975); Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 202, 219 N.E.2d
401, 404, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966); Borden, supra note 3, at 1020-21 ("[t]he significant vested
rights that orthodoxy once attributed to the shareholder interest . . . have long since been
sacrificed on the altar of corporate flexibility.") (footnote omitted). But where the elimination of
minority shareholders' interests can be accomplished despite their rigorous opposition and at a
price determined by those who stand to gain the most from the transaction, unquestionably "there
is an element of unfairness." Id. at 1017. Arguably, it was at this element that Green and Marshel
were directed, not at "fraud" as the term is commonly used. Whether rule 10b-5 is the proper
vehicle for fairness standards is the more important question; see notes 172-92 infra.
170. Logically, these considerations should be immaterial. If a fraud has been perpetrated,
the fact that the shareholders can "ratify" that fraud through their votes should make no
difference. Brodsky, Going Private, 175 N.Y.L.J., April 7, 1976, at 2, col. 2. Similarly, "[tlhere
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federal standards in the "going private" area will be largely determinative of
the rights of minority shareholders in the post-Green and Marshel era. 1
VII. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF SECTION 10(b) AND
ALTERNATIVES TO ITS CONTINUED EXPANSION
Many commentators have championed an increased federal role in defining
"going private" standards, 17 2 based largely on the need for a uniform nation-
wide standard which the spotty state approach cannot provide. At present,
judicial interpretation of section 10(b) and rule lob-5 has been the sole basis
for the expanded federal role. As one observer philosophized: "[Rule lOb-5]--
like the universe, as some scientists conceive it-has limits, but they are
expanding so fast, that we never reach them.'
17 3
Section 10(b) has been generally recognized as a "panacea" designed to
cover fraudulent conduct not otherwise prohibited,17 4 and its enforcement has
been left to the regulatory power of the SEC, which promulgated rule
10b-5.1 7 5 It is believed, however, that "standards presently enforced under
the Rule do not accurately express congressional intent as it existed at the time
of the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.' '176 Indeed, it is unlikely that the concept of "fraud" encompas-
is no more 'fraud' on the minority when a person who had been a stranger to the company
eliminates the minority than when a person who originally took the company public eliminates
the minority." Id. at 2, col. 4.
171. Professor Borden has recommended that standards in the field be defined by state
statutory or case law, and that federal machinery simply be made available for the purpose of
enforcing state law. Borden, supra note 3, at 1037-39. However, the success of this approach is
contingent upon the sufficiency of each state's remedies and the zeal with which those remedies
are enforced; see note 124 supra. Another commentator has urged that while federal courts should
feel free to borrow "fairness" standards from the states, they should not hesitate to use "federal
corporation law" where state law is not sufficient. New Fraud, supra note 2. at 1123. Conversely,
Professor Bromberg has suggested that the state courts might use federal rule lob-5 precedents in
applying their own common law concepts and statutory fraud provisions. Bromberg, supra note
4, § 2.7(4).
172. See O'Neal & Derwin, supra note 4, at 209 ("American :ourts have been singularly
unimaginative in providing remedies for oppressed minority shareholders."); Cary, supra note 3.
at 668 ("Isltate action cannot be effective in providing a responsible corporate statute."); Cohen.
supra note 3, at 596 ("one of the principal reasons for the various anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws . . .was the realization that national problems could not be dealt with
adequately by the states."). But see Privity, supra note 18, at 681-82 (extending 101b5 suits into
corporate fiduciary area where securities transaction is incidental unjustifiably undercuts state
interests). See also Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., Further Thoughts on "Going Private," Second
Annual Securities Seminar of the Detroit Institute for Continuing Legal Education, Mar. 15,
1975, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 294, at D-2 (March 19, 1975).
173. Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. Law. 167, 177 (1974).
174. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (rule 10b-5 is "designed to encompass the infinite
variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and others.").
175. See note 2 supra.
176. Ruder, Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57
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sing breach of fiduciary duty, espoused by the Second Circuit in Green and
Marshel, was what Congress originally intended. At the same time, as both
cases suggest, there is an overriding need for uniform corporate fiduciary
standards to deal with the new species of "fraud" inherent in "going private"
transactions. Alternatives to continued expansion of liability under the guise
of construing section 10(b) and rule lob-5 have been suggested in the form of
a return of power to the states, 1 77 some species of federal incorporation
law, 178 a re-examination and frontal statutory attack by Congress, 17 9 or new
regulations by the SEC. 180 The most practical would appear to be the
regulatory route.
Although the SEC has fairly consistently taken the position that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 are broad enough to remedy abuses found in some "going
private" transactions, 18 1 it has proposed new rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B' 82 to
Nw. U.L. Rev. 627, 628 (1963) (footnote omitted). For example, it is generally acknowledged, but
largely and conveniently overlooked, that section 10(b) probably was not intended to confer a
private right of action (Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. Law. 167 (1974)),
and that rule 10b-5 was intended as an administrative enforcement provision only. Bromberg,
supra note 4, § 2.2(420); Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 Geo. Waslh.
L. Rev. 473, 474-76 (1967). Professor Manne has strongly criticized the tendency of courts,
litigators and commentators to treat rule l0b-5 as if it were a statute (Manne, supra at 474), and
has urged that the rule should be extended only if in each case "the Commission [can] show that It
has complied with the requirements of the [Administrative Procedure Act] or their equivalent."
Id. at 511.
177. See Borden, supra note 3, at 1037.
178. See Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 Geo. L.J. 89 (1972). Cary
rejects this proposal as "politically unrealistic" (Cary, supra note 3, at 700) and suggests as an
alternative a "Federal Corporate Uniformity Act" which would impose nationwide uniform
corporate responsibility standards. Id. at 701-03.
179. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Brodsky, 'Going Private,' 175
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1976, at 4, col. 4; Cary, supra note 3, at 700; Henkel. Codification-Civil
Liability under the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 866, 875 (1967); Privity, supra note 18,
at 665. It has been suggested that federal standards be guided by four principles: 1) the
importance of an independent and impartial judiciary, 2) the preservation of public policy as a
standard for the courts, 3) the need for uniformity and 4) an equal concern for the management
and shareholders of the public company as for the investors engaged in the purchase and sale of
its stock. Cary, supra note 3, at 697.
180. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 57.
181. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975); O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120,
122-23, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st
Dep't 1975) (per curiam); Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate
Responsibility, Law Advisory Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, Nov. 20, 1974,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 80,010, at 84,698. A recent Article stated
that "S.E.C. officials have debated the question of going private for some time but have come to
no clear position. The Division of Enforcement, howeirer, is known to look askance at the
practice on the ground that management controls the timing of such transactions and that the
public stockholder is often asked to finance the process by which he is forced out of his
investment." N.Y. Times, May 6, 1976, at 55, col. 8.
182. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer
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deal specifically with those problems. The proposed rules provide, inter alia,
for vigorous disclosure requirements for tender offerors,' 83 a twenty-day
waiting period during which the proposed transaction cannot be effected, 84
mandatory independent expert- appraisal as to the fairness of the offered
consideration, 185 and, significantly, that every "going private" merger have a
valid business purpose.1
s 6
The proposed rules, however, have been severely criticized, partly as
overreaching by the SEC.1 87 In particular, proposed rule 13e-3B has been
attacked as being too vague,' 88 failing to distinguish between different types
of mergers, adopting state fairnessfbusiness purpose standards without taking
into account their administrative and analytical difficulties, and failing to
justify adoption of these standards into federal law. 189 Although proposed
rule 13e-3A has been viewed more favorably, 190 by mandating a federal
appraisal remedy without inquiry into the motives behind the transaction, 19'
it seemingly does less than what was already accomplished in Green. As one
commentator stated: "[The proposed rules] would not be a substantial im-
provement because they primarily adopt existing . . . standards."',9 2 If
fairness is indeed at the heart of the "going private" question, rules 13e-3A
and -3B only begin to provide the answers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of public companies eliminating their minority (public)
shareholders in order to return to private ownership has increased in recent
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 80,104, at 85,091-93 [hereinafter cited as Release]; see Note,
Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 796, 801-02
(1976).
183. Release, supra note 182, at 85,092.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 85,093. The SEC has not defined, however, what such a purpose might be, and it
is doubtful that it has the power to do so; see note 187 infra and accompanying text.
187. See Greene, supra note 4, at 507; Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection
of Investors: A Comment on the Proposed "Going Private" Rules, 51 Ind. L.J. 433, 446 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Protection]; Note, The Developing Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs and Going
Private, 7 Loyola U.L.J. 431, 457 (1976). See also Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its
1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. Law. 1637, 1643 (1971).
188. Protection, supra note 187, at 447.
189. Greene, supra note 4, at 507. The latter criticism clearly embraces the view that federal
preemption of state corporate common law can only be justified by a "federal statute [which]
clearly evidences a congressional interest in leaving a particular issue resolved by federal law."
Note, The Developing Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs and Going Private, 7 Loyola U.LJ. 431,
451 (1976). If this is true, any attempts by either the SEC or the federal courts to inject fairness or
fiduciary standards into the "going private" arena will be (or have been) ±xtra-legal and
congressional action would be dearly called for. But see Fleischer, supra note 3, at 1179, and
New Fraud, supra note 2, at 1123, both arguing that the federal courts should be free to supply
remedies where, as here, they are clearly needed.
190. Protection, supra note 187, at 451.
191. Id. at 443.
192. Greene, supra note 4, at 499. But see Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and
State Remedies, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 796, 801-02 (1976).
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years. Similarly, protection of minority shareholder rights and vindication of
the fiduciary duty owed them has been a growing federal concern. Since the
anti-fraud provisions of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are, at present, the sole
bases for the expanded federal role, the Second Circuit's reluctance to apply
the section and the rule to "going private" transactions challenged solely on
their inherent unfairness or on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty has,
until recently, relegated dissident minority shareholders to apparently in-
adequate state remedies. Green and Marshel have, arguably, created a new
federal remedy for "going private" abuses by holding that a breach of
fiduciary duty is actionable under rule lob-5 regardless of compliance with
state-sanctioned procedures. Implicit in the decisions is the Second Circuit's
recognition of the need for uniform (federal) standards dealing with corporate
conduct in an era when corporate entities are rarely confined within a state's
borders and opportunities for abuse are prevalent.
Ultimately, the full impact of Green and Marshel will be determined by the
degree to which federal courts borrow from the state courts (and vice versa) in
defining and implementing the standards the Second Circuit espoused. As
Green and Marshel imply, the essence of the "going private" problem is the
ability of controlling shareholders to take unfair advantage of the minority
under the guise of compliance with state law. It is submitted that state courts,
by virtue of their vested interest in attracting business to their locale and by
their limited geographical jurisdiction, are ill-equipped to afford minority
shareholders the protection needed. Perhaps the most valuable contribution of
Green and Marshel is their espousal of minority shareholder protection as an
object of overriding federal interest, thereby providing minority shareholders
with a federal forum in which to vindicate their rights and with federal
standards with which to implement them. This objective will be most difficult
to achieve if state law predominates as those standards are developed.
Claudia L. Taft
